Whenever attempting to understand a person's philosophical perspective it seems quite risky to excerpt a small piece of the much larger 'story' they are trying to illustrate in order to attack it, since you always risk the possibility that the contextual meaningfulness of that particular expression being lost to its isolation from its necessary context. All 3 excerpts you include in this article share basically the same structure in that they all propose that the most important aspects of the human experience are not reducible to any kind of physical 'existence', a basic and irrefutable fact of life, and that therefore our 'naive myths of value' necessarily require some degree of sophistication to comport with reality. To then take such a presupposed statement, completely bereft of not only the context but also whatever proposals the author is suggesting as an alternative narrative, and to then attack his critique of 'naive myths of value' as though he is just claiming that 'nothing is real, nothing matters, lets all die and get this over with' seems on its face to be in poor form, if not altogether bad faith.
Of all three excerpts I think the third is the easiest to critique as 'human life has absolutely no meaning' is clearly necessarily stating that it has no 'external, divinely vouchsafed' meaning, as 'meaningfulness' itself can only have meaning in the context of human experience. Of course human experience can't have externally intrinsic meaning because there is no meaning external to humanity which it could itself possess... This is not even a scientific principle, it is simply a principle of basic logic. That 'as far as we can tell, human subjectivity would not be missed' by the universe were the destruction of humanity to come about is not necessarily an existential claim as you seem to interpret it, but simply a de minimis description of the physical universe as we understand it.
In fact, of everything he says across all three excerpts, the most irresponsible seems to be the final line of the paragraph excerpted from Sapiens where he says 'Hence, any meaning that people ascribe to their lives is just a delusion' which is similarly difficult to critique since it is of course removed from its much larger context, but which seems to require that by 'delusion' he is using the term in a more technical sense as in 'a belief about the world founded in something other than direct substance/experience' as opposed to a more colloquial meaning of delusion as 'a strongly held wrongful belief'. But again, to critique any such claims requires an extensive effort to understand them and it seems here that the fundamental principle of 'charitability' in interpretation of meaning and intent is not really one you've attempted to employ here to any real extent. In any such discussions of absolute meaning there will necessarily be statements of fact which are incomplete like 'there is no meaning' which in one context is necessarily true and in another is necessarily false. We can use this as a compass to understand where a speaker is coming from by trying to understand in what context a statement which appears on its surface to us to be false would instead be true, and therefore deduce the position from which they are able to make such a claim.
Alternatively, and depending on our own personal motivations, we can use the ambiguities inherent in language and the very limited bandwidth of human communication to caricature a persons positions and then effortlessly dismantle them as an immediate benefit. You seem to take issue with Yuval's claim that human rights are not existentially 'real', but by all but the most generous interpretations of reality that is exactly the case. To suggest that such a statement alone substantiates his opinion on the issue of human rights is laughable though, he obviously has some basis for what we are referring to as 'having human rights' even if he frames it differently or uses different language to articulate it. The idea that he is suggesting that since human rights are not physically existentially real that we should therefore be unburdened by our concern with them seems on its face to be entirely spurious, and whatever purpose there could be in attacking an intellectual's presuppository premise without including any of their actual case, argument or conclusions drawn from such a substitution of premises seems quite dubious as any presupposed fact which is not in some way provisionally dependent would have no purpose being stated as a premise in the first place as it would simply be de facto assumed to be the case by both parties. From this basic fact we can conclude as a general principle that without access to the speaker to defend the usage and delineations of their presuppositions, we can only argue their conclusions within the accepted context of their presuppositions, as to attack the presupposed basis of their argument without them, or anyone else, to defend/expand on that choice as necessary is almost entirely meaningless, as if a person had to explain the entire causal chain of rationality any time they wanted to say anything, nothing could ever be said at all. We must necessarily limit our communication to the necessary and relevant suppositions, and therefore as listeners absent the capacity to interrogate a speaker we must necessarily accept the premises at the outset or not engage at all as even the most cherished cornerstones of our beliefs are trivial to logically assail when forced into bounded linguistic claims.
You seem to be making huge leaps of logic when you claim that
"He says, there is no meaning whatsoever to human life. It doesn’t exist. If human subjectivity were to disappear, it would not be missed."
when he doesn't remotely appear to make any such claim, in fact I think it would be much more accurate to interpret his statements as:
"He says, there is no [intrinsic & external] meaning whatsoever to human life. It doesn’t [have any way in which it could physically] exist. If human subjectivity were to disappear, it would not be missed [by the remaining physical universe]."
Which seems on its face to be necessarily true. The level at which he seems to be speaking is at a very basic level of fundamentalism where he makes clear at the outset that in a discussion of meaning, there are clear domains in which meaningfulness is a useful concept and also that there exists a physical dimension to reality, the dimension that science claims as its exclusive purview, and within such a physical dimension, questions of meaning have no substance or utility. Even though I may happen to agree with many of your claims about cosmic meaningfulness that transcends the physical dimension of reality, it doesn't seem necessarily in conflict with anything Yuval is saying when properly interpreted and understood. Your critique here seems therefore essentially to be arguing against a 'straw man'.
It seems necessary when contesting ideas that there be an advocate for the other side, so if you intend to perform such critiques alone without someone to challenge you then I feel you have the responsibility to be charitable and 'steel man' the opposing side's case before attacking it, otherwise you risk yelling into a proverbial echo chamber with no one to challenge and refine your ideas. If you'd like to be fairly and charitably challenged for the purposes of growing and refining the cosmoerotic humanist movement, I am happy to volunteer my time in service of that mission.
Whenever attempting to understand a person's philosophical perspective it seems quite risky to excerpt a small piece of the much larger 'story' they are trying to illustrate in order to attack it, since you always risk the possibility that the contextual meaningfulness of that particular expression being lost to its isolation from its necessary context. All 3 excerpts you include in this article share basically the same structure in that they all propose that the most important aspects of the human experience are not reducible to any kind of physical 'existence', a basic and irrefutable fact of life, and that therefore our 'naive myths of value' necessarily require some degree of sophistication to comport with reality. To then take such a presupposed statement, completely bereft of not only the context but also whatever proposals the author is suggesting as an alternative narrative, and to then attack his critique of 'naive myths of value' as though he is just claiming that 'nothing is real, nothing matters, lets all die and get this over with' seems on its face to be in poor form, if not altogether bad faith.
Of all three excerpts I think the third is the easiest to critique as 'human life has absolutely no meaning' is clearly necessarily stating that it has no 'external, divinely vouchsafed' meaning, as 'meaningfulness' itself can only have meaning in the context of human experience. Of course human experience can't have externally intrinsic meaning because there is no meaning external to humanity which it could itself possess... This is not even a scientific principle, it is simply a principle of basic logic. That 'as far as we can tell, human subjectivity would not be missed' by the universe were the destruction of humanity to come about is not necessarily an existential claim as you seem to interpret it, but simply a de minimis description of the physical universe as we understand it.
In fact, of everything he says across all three excerpts, the most irresponsible seems to be the final line of the paragraph excerpted from Sapiens where he says 'Hence, any meaning that people ascribe to their lives is just a delusion' which is similarly difficult to critique since it is of course removed from its much larger context, but which seems to require that by 'delusion' he is using the term in a more technical sense as in 'a belief about the world founded in something other than direct substance/experience' as opposed to a more colloquial meaning of delusion as 'a strongly held wrongful belief'. But again, to critique any such claims requires an extensive effort to understand them and it seems here that the fundamental principle of 'charitability' in interpretation of meaning and intent is not really one you've attempted to employ here to any real extent. In any such discussions of absolute meaning there will necessarily be statements of fact which are incomplete like 'there is no meaning' which in one context is necessarily true and in another is necessarily false. We can use this as a compass to understand where a speaker is coming from by trying to understand in what context a statement which appears on its surface to us to be false would instead be true, and therefore deduce the position from which they are able to make such a claim.
Alternatively, and depending on our own personal motivations, we can use the ambiguities inherent in language and the very limited bandwidth of human communication to caricature a persons positions and then effortlessly dismantle them as an immediate benefit. You seem to take issue with Yuval's claim that human rights are not existentially 'real', but by all but the most generous interpretations of reality that is exactly the case. To suggest that such a statement alone substantiates his opinion on the issue of human rights is laughable though, he obviously has some basis for what we are referring to as 'having human rights' even if he frames it differently or uses different language to articulate it. The idea that he is suggesting that since human rights are not physically existentially real that we should therefore be unburdened by our concern with them seems on its face to be entirely spurious, and whatever purpose there could be in attacking an intellectual's presuppository premise without including any of their actual case, argument or conclusions drawn from such a substitution of premises seems quite dubious as any presupposed fact which is not in some way provisionally dependent would have no purpose being stated as a premise in the first place as it would simply be de facto assumed to be the case by both parties. From this basic fact we can conclude as a general principle that without access to the speaker to defend the usage and delineations of their presuppositions, we can only argue their conclusions within the accepted context of their presuppositions, as to attack the presupposed basis of their argument without them, or anyone else, to defend/expand on that choice as necessary is almost entirely meaningless, as if a person had to explain the entire causal chain of rationality any time they wanted to say anything, nothing could ever be said at all. We must necessarily limit our communication to the necessary and relevant suppositions, and therefore as listeners absent the capacity to interrogate a speaker we must necessarily accept the premises at the outset or not engage at all as even the most cherished cornerstones of our beliefs are trivial to logically assail when forced into bounded linguistic claims.
You seem to be making huge leaps of logic when you claim that
"He says, there is no meaning whatsoever to human life. It doesn’t exist. If human subjectivity were to disappear, it would not be missed."
when he doesn't remotely appear to make any such claim, in fact I think it would be much more accurate to interpret his statements as:
"He says, there is no [intrinsic & external] meaning whatsoever to human life. It doesn’t [have any way in which it could physically] exist. If human subjectivity were to disappear, it would not be missed [by the remaining physical universe]."
Which seems on its face to be necessarily true. The level at which he seems to be speaking is at a very basic level of fundamentalism where he makes clear at the outset that in a discussion of meaning, there are clear domains in which meaningfulness is a useful concept and also that there exists a physical dimension to reality, the dimension that science claims as its exclusive purview, and within such a physical dimension, questions of meaning have no substance or utility. Even though I may happen to agree with many of your claims about cosmic meaningfulness that transcends the physical dimension of reality, it doesn't seem necessarily in conflict with anything Yuval is saying when properly interpreted and understood. Your critique here seems therefore essentially to be arguing against a 'straw man'.
It seems necessary when contesting ideas that there be an advocate for the other side, so if you intend to perform such critiques alone without someone to challenge you then I feel you have the responsibility to be charitable and 'steel man' the opposing side's case before attacking it, otherwise you risk yelling into a proverbial echo chamber with no one to challenge and refine your ideas. If you'd like to be fairly and charitably challenged for the purposes of growing and refining the cosmoerotic humanist movement, I am happy to volunteer my time in service of that mission.
With love.